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In recent years few British Prime Minister’s and Chancellor’s of the Exchequer have been 
treated so unfavourably as John Major and Norman Lamont.  As Prime Minister, John 
Major’s ability to govern was hampered by deep-seated divisions within the Conservative 
Party, most notably on the issue of Europe.  These splits climaxed in the decision to call a 
leadership election in the summer of 1995, which produced a majority (though by no means 
overwhelming) for Major.  From then on his period in office was marred by the continuing 
presence of factions within the Conservative Party, which proved to be a significant reason 
behind the 1997 general election defeat.   As Chancellor from 1990 to 1993, Norman Lamont 
played a central role in many of the policy decisions that proved unpalatable to the 
Conservative Party faithful and the British electorate, and from which he sought to distance 
himself when he returned to the backbenches.  For much of this period he acted as a thorn in 
Major’s side, being critical of past and present policy.  The primary aim of these actions was 
to place Lamont in a more favourable public position and to cast himself into a central role 
amongst those MPs who were disenchanted with government policy.  It was therefore not 
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unpredictable that the relationship between the Prime Minister and his former Chancellor 
soured during this period. 
 
The memoirs of both individuals consequently provide an overdue opportunity for them to 
answer their critics and to set the record straight.  Until now, the ups and downs of the Major 
governments have been primarily limited to secondary accounts, of which Anthony Seldon’s 
biography of John Major has been widely regarded to provide the most balanced chronicle.1  
The publication of the memoirs of Major and Lamont thus provide fresh and first hand 
information on the political affairs that dominated Britain for much of the 1990s.  These two 
books are of great importance to the contemporary historian as they provide the first account 
from anyone centrally involved in the Major premiership.  And although Lamont was no 
longer at the centre of office from 1993 onwards, he continued to exercise a degree of 
influence through his opinions from the backbenches.  An examination of these two memoirs 
therefore not only provides an opportunity to analyse the views held by Lamont and Major 
when they were in office, and the extent to which they worked together, but also the degree to 
which their views differed on key policies. 
 
Changing style 
John Major’s rise to the office of Prime Minister was as swift as any in recent times, having 
entered the Cabinet in 1987 as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, with subsequent appointments 
as Foreign Secretary in July 1989 and as Chancellor in October 1989.  When he entered 
number 10 Downing Street in November 1990 he did so as the youngest Prime Minister of 
the century.  Just over a year later he led the Conservative Party to victory in the 1992 general 
election, while he successfully negotiated what was then seen as an acceptable agreement at 
the December 1991 Maastricht European Council.  Major’s predecessor as Prime Minister, 
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Margaret Thatcher, would almost certainly have lost the general election, whilst it would 
have been difficult to imagine her managing to bring the Maastricht negotiations to a 
satisfactory conclusion.  Major was consequently cast as the new hero of the Conservative 
Party.  Yet, over the next five years, his premiership was subjected to unremitting attacks 
from within and outwith government.  A great number of the MPs who had supported Major 
in the November 1990 leadership election lost faith in his ability to govern and consequently 
deserted him.  Many of these politicians had, of course, never been Major supporters ‘through 
and through’.  Instead, their support of Major had been based on a desire to keep Michael 
Heseltine out of office rather than to get Major in.  Most significantly, Margaret Thatcher, 
who had offered patronage to Major during the leadership contest, withdrew that support in 
the post-1992 period and was particularly critical of the government’s negotiating position on 
Europe.  In many senses, it appeared that her vehement attacks on government policy were a 
way of coming to terms with her own ejection from the position as Prime Minister.  But in so 
doing she helped to create a civil war within the Tory Party that destroyed any chances of re-
election and rubbished any credibility the Party had for stable government. 
 
As Prime Minister, John Major struggled to keep the Conservative Party together and sought 
to establish a set of policies that represented the views of Cabinet (and the Party) as a whole.  
A change in the style and method of government was both reflective of his own views and the 
reality that the more dogmatic stance of Thatcher had influenced her own downfall.  But the 
change of style also emphasised that the position of the Prime Minister had changed also.  
Whereas Thatcher had been in power for a long time, Major was less experienced and had 
been dependent on the support of his colleagues for his recent appointment.  But while this 
shift to a more consensual form of government had the principal aim of creating more stable 
policy-making, it was not without its faults.  The Prime Minister adopted a more reactive 
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method of decision-making, with too much time spent considering the implication and 
ramification of policy decisions rather than offering a more strategic direction.   
 
John Major was basically a more sensitive Prime Minister than Thatcher had been.  He took 
on board the criticisms that regularly appeared in the newspapers, while a great deal of effort 
was spent trying to convince those politicians who were in effect unpersuadable.  That is not 
to say that John Major did not have the necessary ‘steel’ to be Prime Minister.  He weathered 
a great deal of political criticism and managed to steer the economy to a more sure-footed 
basis than it had been for many years.  Tony Blair and Gordon Brown thus inherited one of 
the strongest economic foundations in recent times.  This was set against a torrent of 
backbench criticism, a precariously low Parliamentary majority of 21 obtained in the 1992 
general election and a great deal of altercation over sleaze.  
 
Whereas John Major’s appointment as Prime Minister was somewhat unexpected, Norman 
Lamont was fortunate to be promoted to Chancellor from his previous position as Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury.  In many respects this was a natural progression for Lamont who 
had also held the post of Financial Secretary to the Treasury and was consequently familiar 
with the Treasury brief.  Major regarded this as being especially important after the 
turbulence of the recent leadership campaign, during which Lamont acted as Major’s 
campaign manager.  But such a position did not mean that Lamont and Major had a close 
relationship.  By contrast, their relationship was a working one that never matured into a 
close friendship.  
 
Lamont’s period as Chancellor was not a particularly prosperous one for himself, or for the 
nation as a whole.  To be sure, he inherited and encountered a set of economic conditions that 
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would have tested the most able occupier of number 11 Downing Street.  Of the issues that 
dogged his period in office, he witnessed a deep recession that was mirrored by an increase in 
unemployment and house repossession.  He was notably also at the centre of policy-making 
when Britain left the Exchange Rate Mechanism.  Some would say that Lamont should have 
resigned from office at that juncture.  Yet, ERM membership was a policy that had been 
championed by Major when he was himself Chancellor and it was he who had overseen 
Britain’s entry to the system.  Thus, if the Chancellor had jumped ship then the Prime 
Minister would have been extremely exposed and may have had to follow.   The ERM 
debacle nevertheless destroyed the remaining vestiges of credibility that the Chancellor 
possessed.  With his confidence ravished, Lamont plodded on until his removal from the 
government in May 1993.  This was despite Major having offered Lamont the post of 
Environment Secretary.  John Major’s decision to remove Lamont from the Treasury had 
been determined by two main factors.  In the first instance, it was clear that the Chancellor 
did not enjoy the faith of the electorate, the business community or the Conservative Party.  
More fundamentally, Major realised that the liability of his Chancellor reflected a weakness 
in his own leadership and Lamont’s departure was thus the diversion that Major needed. 
 
A tall tale 
Inevitably, both memoirs aim to provide the inside account of the Major years, although John 
Major goes much further by providing a ‘full’ history of his life before he entered Parliament.  
Such insights are often just as important as the hard political facts that are contained in any 
memoir.  This is because it provides the reader with a degree of understanding of the 
environment that shaped the individual.  Our understanding of Margaret Thatcher would be 
all the less if we were not aware of the important role that her Alderman father had in shaping 
her beliefs during her upbringing in Grantham.  Major accordingly provides a full account of 
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his early years, and in so doing paints a picture of an extraordinary rise that took him from 
Brixton to Westminster.  The importance of this path is that it provided John Major with an 
understanding of the difficulties that the poor and disadvantaged face, and established a 
genuine concern of the need for an equality of opportunity.  This is all the more significant as 
his upbringing and beliefs contrasted with the traditional image of the Conservative Party.  
John Major thus presents a figure of a leader that possessed strong beliefs and someone who 
was concerned with the need to weigh the merits of policies before taking decisions.  This is, 
of course, different from saying that he had no beliefs, as many of his opponents routinely 
suggested. 
 
What is particularly surprising about this book is how well written it is, as well as the extent 
of the information it reveals.  It is also an extremely detailed book and does not suffer from 
being turgid or repetitious.  And while there will always be a degree of bias in any memoir, 
Major is neither churlish nor bitter in the account that he provides.  He does in fact go to great 
lengths to provide a frank account of the 1990-1997 administration and the supporters and  
opponents who figured so prominently during this period, from Michael Heseltine to Richard 
Body.  On the latter he writes: ‘Richard Body was a Quaker from what in some ways was a 
liberal tradition.  Quirky - an early environmentalist and “small- is-beautiful” campaigner - 
Body despised office and distrusted the big battalions - Brussels being his particular 
shibboleth.  When the Conservative whip was taken away from a number of rebels in 
November 1994, Body voluntarily joined them.  A comment I made of him in an unguarded 
moment was to become celebrated - at the mention of his name, I said, “I hear the sound of 




Sadly, the same style is absent from Norman Lamont’s account of his period as Chancellor 
and his life after leaving the government.  To be sure, he merely wanted to describe the 
events that shaped his period of high office and not to provide an autobiography.  But 
although his book suffers from the absence of an account of his formative years, it also does 
not contain the degree of detail that might have been expected.  Lamont’s memoirs equally 
suffer from a bitterness that spoils the work, as he is all too quick to note those whom he 
considered plotted against him, especially in the months after Black Wednesday. 
 
From reading the 1341 pages of these two books it is clear that Europe was a core divide 
between Major and Lamont, though the extent of this was not so evident when Lamont was in 
office.  Major was himself surprised by these developments.  On Lamont he writes: ‘I was 
surprised by the speed of his movement to the Euro-sceptics’ cause, since never in the years 
he had worked with me had he even hinted at such a proposition’ (p.587).  With the 
constraints of office removed, Lamont thus attempted to cast himself in more Euro-sceptic 
clothing than was the case when he was in office.  There were of, course, cunning reasons for 
this change of tact.  The former Chancellor could both distance himself from many of the 
policies that he had been centrally linked with, while at the same time being able to enact a 
degree of revenge by means of criticising the government.  It is consequently not 
unsurprising that there are notable differences in the accounts that each provide of the 
Maastricht Treaty negotiations and Britain’s exit from the ERM. 
 
In the case of the Maastricht Treaty talks, there now exists a considerable body of literature 
devoted to this negotiation that culminated in the Maastricht European Council of December 
1991.2  A key negotiating objective for Britain at that meeting was the attainment of an opt-
out from the third stage of economic and monetary union and ergo not being committed to 
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having to accept a single currency.  To this end the British government had been working on 
an opt-out text since June 1991, which it intended to present at Maastricht as a non-negotiable 
objective.  But when Lamont at the Maastricht Finance Ministers meeting advanced the text, 
the rest of the Finance Ministers decided to examine the text, a tactic that angered the 
Chancellor.  His response to this development was to dramatically walk out of the Finance 
Ministers meeting so as to clarify the British position with Major.  The effect of this gesture 
by Lamont was to jeopardise the attainment of the opt-out.  Yet, whereas Major reflects that 
‘it was an extraordinary way for Norman to behave’ (p.284), Lamont notes that ‘at no stage 
did John Major express the slightest concern’ (p.132).  Indeed, Lamont also writes that ‘far 
from endangering the negotiations, I am quite sure the walk-out had exactly the desired 
effect’ (p.132).  But what Lamont omits is that Major in fact secured the opt-out in a side 
meeting with the Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, and the German Chancellor, Helmut 
Kohl (p.287).  This therefore highlights the way in which memoirs have a tendency to present 
a more favourable portrait than otherwise might be the case. 
 
Britain’s exit from the ERM provides a similar opportunity to compare both books.  What is 
surprising from these accounts is how little knowledge Lamont had of Britain’s entry to the 
ERM.  To be sure, as Chief Secretary, he was not involved in the tactics over the date or level 
of entry, but his appointment as Chancellor took place just over one month after Britain 
entered the system in October 1990 and a greater command of this important subject could 
have been expected.   Of the two books, Major’s account of Britain’s exit from the ERM is 
impressive in the degree of detail.  Lamont too provides a thorough account, though this is 
tinged with a sceptic tone and bitterness that often clouds the picture that he paints.  This is 
somewhat to be expected as the period marked the end of his political career, after which he 
limped through until his exit from the Cabinet in May 1993.  Nevertheless, the overall 
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impression obtained from both books is the desire by Major to ensure that all decisions 
concerning the ERM involved the agreement of key Cabinet colleagues.  Lamont was 
unsympathetic to such a strategy, noting that Major was ‘slow to take the difficult decisions 
that we needed’ (p.250). 
  
In both the case of the Maastricht Treaty talks and Britain’s exit from the ERM, John Major 
provides the more solid and detailed account and reviews the events as they transpired as well 
as the key individuals that took part in them.  As such his book is that much more valuable to 
the researcher who wants to find out about the workings of government and negotiating 
tactics.  That is not to say that Lamont provides a shallow account of his period in office.   
But while his book allows the reader to obtain an understanding of how events unfolded on 
various policy issues, there is a genuine lack of information concerning the nuts and bolts of 
government policy-making.  This is particularly so for the secretive world of Cabinet 
Committees, the way Britain negotiates in the European Union, and the manner in which the 




What is evident from both books is the sheer extent to which the Conservative Party was 
divided for much of the Major premiership.  This was particularly true for the Euro-sceptics 
whom Major notes  ‘were undermining everything we did’ (p.608).  In an effort to placate 
this division of views, the Prime Minister steered government policy in an evermore Euro-
sceptical direction, as evidenced by vetoing the candidacy of the Belgian Prime Minister, 
Jean Luc Dehaene, for the post of President of the European Commission.  But such gestures 
did little to ease the division within the Conservative Party.  By the summer of 1995 Major 
 10 
had had enough, announcing that he would resign the leadership of the Conservative Party so 
as to assert his position in the subsequent leadership election.  As he noted, it was time to ‘put 
up, or shut up’ (p.612).  To this challenge, John Redwood resigned from the Cabinet to face 
up to Major.  The effect of this was to alleviate any pressure on Lamont to stand, who now 
concluded that ‘there was no point in my thinking any longer about the matter’ (p.438).  
Lamont is somewhat generous to himself in considering that he would have put up a 
challenge, though his stance of supporting Redwood demonstrated the extent to which he had 
drifted away from Major, for whom he had one acted as campaign manager in the 1990 
leadership contest. 
 
The outcome of the 1995 contest was a two-to-one majority for Major.  Although convincing, 
it nevertheless demonstrated the degree of opposition to him.  Both books provide a 
stimulating account of this period in the history of the Conservative Party.  To this end, 
Lamont provides us with the amusing story of how the Conservative backbencher, David 
Evans, drove Redwood and Lamont to dinner in his Rolls Royce after an evening of 
campaigning.  Lamont recollects that ‘As we drive down the Mall towards Buckingham 
Palace, David said, “Just imagine, John, this is what you will be doing next week, driving to 
see the Queen”.  I wondered whether he really believed it?  I certainly did not’ (p.442.) 
 
The outcome of the leadership election was nonetheless a symbolic event.  Both Lamont and 
Major had viewed the campaign as an opportunity to transform their careers.   Yet, Major’s 
victory had not resolved the conflict in the Conservative Party.  The Prime Minister appeared 
unconvinced that his position was now secure and did not set out to dominate policy.  Lamont 
also found that the leadership contest had not resurrected his position.  If anything, it only 
further demonstrated his bitterness at having been removed from the Treasury.  The overall 
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outcome was that from 1995 onwards the fortunes of the Conservative Party plunged ever 
deeper towards defeat.  The issue of Europe continued to divide the Party, which increasingly 
became ungovernable as MPs lost any concern for Party discipline.  At the same time the 
Prime Minister offered little strategic policy direction and instead resembled something of a 
weather vein.  The effect of this was to further remove Britain from the centre of policy-
making within the European Union and after 17 years of Conservative government the nation 
was not at the ‘heart of Europe’, as Major had once desired. 
 
In the battle of the memoirs it is evident that John Major is likely to be declared the winner.  
His book is by far the better-written and more comprehensive account of the Major years.  
Lamont’s book is nonetheless a significant contribution to our knowledge of this period of 
our history.  But while Lamont is an important politician, the fact remains that his book is 
spoilt by the bitterness that he obviously feels towards many of his former colleagues.  Both 
books do, however, contain many amusing anecdotes, with Lamont being perfectly aware of 
the standing that he had within the Conservative Party and among the public.  To this end, he 
recounts how he was spotted by a small boy shortly after his departure from the Treasury.  
Turning to his mother, the boy announced, ‘Mum, it’s that man who has ruined the country’ 
(p.374).  This was certainly something of an overstatement and Norman Lamont was in fact a 
better Chancellor than he has been credited for.  Yet, his own views of Europe have clouded 
this record.  And while the Conservative Party of today shares many of the policies held by 
Lamont, it is perfectly clear that there is an ongoing battle between the Europhiles and Euro-
sceptics for the soul of the Party.  Watching this from the sidelines, John Major can observe a 
Tory Party that has attempted to remove the ‘Major years’ from its memory. 
Alasdair Blair 
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